Search This Blog

Monday, 8 June 2015

Brussels Falls to the French!

The short but sharp engagement at Nivelles left Von Balck's column routed and in full retreat by midday. The French declined to pursue after Hinault and Moncassin held a brief conference on the battlefield. At the urging of  Representative on Mission Schwarz, who appreciated the political and psychological significance of Brussels, the French Avant Gard marched north on the provincial capital. By nightfall French hussars were carousing in the city.

A French Hussar about to carouse...

General Moncassin remained in position on the high ground east of Nivelles. His men had had the hardest fighting that morning and although some would have marched north on Brussels to claim a prize they saw as rightfully theirs, most were glad of the opportunity to bivouac and rest. The weather was good and the night a mild one. Moncassin's division was thus well placed to cover the right flank of the French axis of advance.

That afternoon Le Clerc's division passed through Nivelles and with their flank protected by their comrades, continued north in the direction of Brussels, halting for the night at the village of Waterloo.

The Reserve, under the direct command of Deschamps, marched in their wake but only reached Nivelles by nightfall. Deschamps commandeered a tavern in the town for his headquarters and dined with Moncassin.

For their part the Austrians were in disarray. Von Balck's defeated column reached Ligny by nightfall and there, through a combination of exhaustion and the restoration of discipline, it halted. O'Reilly had spent the day marching in the direction of Wavre and by nightfall was halfway between that place and Gembloux. Thus the left wing of the Austrian army was widely dispersed and in no postion to threaten the French.

The Austrian right was similarly wrong footed by the French victory at Nivelles. Von Schwarzkopf, instead of cutting the French axis of advance by marching from Hal to Waterloo, moved south to Braine Le Comte, allowing his enemy to sever his line of communication with Brussels. Von Luck's column was in the van, groping its way south to Soignes, reaching the town long after the French had departed.

As night fell on 10 May the Austrians still had an army in being. It remained to see what the effect of losing Brussels and the drubbing meted out to von Balck would have on the Austrian will to resist. Von Schwarzkopf's options were limited. He could fight on but his forces were divided and the French had captured his base, or he could sue for peace and try and negotiate an honourable settlement.

It was to be a long night...

Sunday, 31 May 2015

Battle of Nivelles 10 May 1794

The battlefield, looking east from Nivelles



A low ridge, running north-south across the French axis of advance dominates the field. The Austrian commander, on good advice from his staff, opted to position his main force east of the high ground on the reserve slope. He anchored his flanks on the two woods and put a battalion of infantry in the farm and windmill on the crest of the ridge to break up any enemy advance.The Austrian artillery were also placed on the crest of the ridge. Von Balck's biggest problem was that he didn't have enough troops to hold his position if the French attacked with sufficient determination.

The French Generals were mindful of the fate of more than one of their colleagues who had not pressed forward with sufficient vigour, and the presence of one of the more zealous Representatives on Mission, a Parisian bookeeper by the name of Gerard Schwarz, made them nervous. They elected to attack at dawn and when dawn broke and the field was shrouded in mist they decided to attack immediately nonetheless.

Because of the mist the French were able to advance relatively unscathed until they were almost upon the Austrian outposts.

From left to right: 

  • French chasseurs a cheval advance in column along the Nivelles road halting only when they are engaged at short range by Austrian artillery. 
  • Le Clerc's infantry, deployed in two demi-brigades a la ordre mixte push forward in the centre
  • On the French right three columns of French light infantry belonging to Hinault's avant garde push up the ridge. The two right hand columns, of two battalions each are charged with clearing the woods to their front and flanking the Austrian position.
  • Four squadrons of hussars envelop the Austrian left 


Above: two demi-brigades of Le Clerc's division push up the ridge with artillery to the fore

The opening shots as the Austrian and French guns engage. The mist began to clear as the artillery duel unfolded. The French hussars are threatening to turn the Austrian infantry's flank in the upper right of the picture
The view from behind the Austrian position. To the left of the windmill the Austrian guns are giving a good account of themselves despite being outnumbered and threatened by French cavalry to their rear. The battalion in the farm and windmill has destroyed a French battalion in column with a series of well disciplined volleys. The remaining battalions of the leading French demi-brigade press on however, and have thrown skirmishers over the crest of the ridge. The Austrian left flank battalions have formed square as French hussars, just out of the picture, are hovering menacingly outside musket range. Two battalions of Austrian infantry have failed to do likewise however and are being charged by the French chasseurs.

The end of the battle. A combination of French infantry in column and charging chasseurs a cheval defeat the Austrian infantry before an belated attack by Austrian dragoons is pressed home. The Austrian army collapses and streams from the field in disorder.

This battle was fought using the 'Bicorne and Bayonet' variant of Phil Barker's 'Horses, Foot and Guns'.

The French outnumbered the Austrians significantly deploying 8800 infantry in 11 battalions; 1500 light cavalry in six squadrons; and 32 guns against 4800 infantry in six battalions; 500 dragoons in two squadrons and only 16 guns.

The Austrian commander escaped with his life. It would be a couple of days before he would have any idea of what units had manged to extricate themselves  from the French pursuit in any sort of order.

In fairness to the Austrians it is difficult to see what they could have done given the French superiority in numbers. The mist prevented a move forward as the French columns approached the crest of the ridge as the Austrians only became aware of the advance when it was too late. Von Balck was too timid and indecisive, receiving a - 1 for his PIP die, and this meant he failed to commit his dragoons until it was too late. Poor leadership at unit level can be the only explanation for a prompt failure to form square against French cavalry in the centre but even had this not been the case the use of combined arms by the French, together with decisive leadership, meant where the Austrians did form square on their left they were shot to pieces by artillery.


Thursday, 29 January 2015

1794 Campaign: The Opening

The French commenced their 1794 campaign in the Austrian Netherlands on 8 May, the Austrians were expecting an offensive once the weather improved and it was no surprise when their scouts and spies sent word that the Army du Sambre et Meuse was on the move that fine spring morning.

The Austrians had chosen to deploy using a variant of the cordon system, with their headquarters in Brussels where a reserve of good quality infantry and heavy cavalry were located under the direct command of von Schwarzkopf. Mons was left exposed but a division sized column was stationed around Ath to the northwest of the border city. In the centre, another division was quartered in Charleroi. Mindful of the need to protect his lines of communication and the city of Leige, the Austrian commander had deployed a strong division in the environs of Dinant under the command of Deiter O'Reilly, a descendant of the wild geese that migrated to Austria over 150 years earlier.

The French had concentrated around Maubeuge and Beaumont. Early in the morning the Avant Garde under the Breton Chef de Division Jacques Hinault, formerly a lawyer in Brest, marched north, crossing the border before first light. By midday his cavalry were in Seneffe, the light infantry and horse artillery close behind. That afternoon, as the sun went down elements of Rene Moncassin's division began to arrive in the small town, many of them seasoned veterans of the previous years campaign. The two generals dined in a tavern off the town square.

Another French division, led by General Paul Le Clerc, a former NCO in the Royalist army, reached Binche, to the south of Hinault and Moncassin, that afternoon. Le Clerc's column was less experienced, and included many volunteers and conscripts who had only recently joined the colours.

The overall French commander, another former NCO, General Henri Deschamps marched on a route west of the main body and occupied Mons with scarcely a shot being fired.

By dawn on 9th May von Schwarzkopf had word of the fall of Mons and news that French troops had bypassed Charleroi and had broken the Austrian cordon. Von Schwarzkopf roused himself and marched south to Hal, having sent a courier overnight to his subordinate in Ath, General Peter von Luck, with instructions to march north to meet him. Konrad von Balck, the Austrian commander in Charleroi, was ordered to abandon the city and make haste to Nivelles by Quatre Bras. The cordon was to snap shut and cut off the head of the French advance. O'Reilly meanwhile, exercised uncommon initiative and vigour for one so habitually drunk and by early evening on the 9th was half way to Gembloux, unfortunately this put him well to the north east of the rest of his comrades.

After lurching forward with such enthusiasm on the 8th, the French advance was altogether more cautious on the 9th. The Avant Garde was in Nivelles by midday and there it halted. By early evening Moncassin's division had arrived to reinforce Hinault's troops. As darkness fell, Austrian dragoons stumbled on French picquets to the east of the town. By midnight the campfires of von Balck's division were clearly visible to the French. Hinault conferred with his colleague Moncassin, the lawyer and former corporal resolving to attack at first light. After all, Le Clerc was only half a days march away should anything go wrong.

Deschamps for his part ,was in Soignes by midday and there he stopped. His information was that Austrian troops were on the move west of the river Sennes and he decided to await developments.

The Austrian Von Balck, camped east of Nivelles, was a worried man. His cavalry had done their work well, and he knew with some certainty he was outnumbered by at least two to one. The question was whether to retreat or give battle? All the information he had was that reinforcements were at least 24 hours away. He sent couriers out overnight but it was too late, as dawn broke on the 10th May, the French drums could be heard...

Friday, 23 January 2015

1794 Campaign: Introduction

For my first attempt at a campaign I've chosen the old cockpit of Europe, the Low Countries, specifically the Sambre Muese region of Belgium.

There are a couple of reasons for this: firstly, I have a good map of the area; secondly, it was a theatre that pre-occupied the Revolutionary Government in Paris, offering as it did the shortest route for Allied armies to march on the French capital.

That said, the 'sitting tenant' in Belgium at this time, the Austrians, were not particularly interested in what was a troublesome, if wealthy, province and were chiefly interested in using it as a bargaining chip in peace negotiations, should these occur, and trading it for some other province nearer Vienna.

The theatre of operations did offer the most direct route to Brussels in the north and Cambrai - Le Cateau in the south. Whilst both the French and Coalition were focused on maritime Flanders in the west, in our alternative timeline they had nevertheless committed large bodies of troops to this area.

For the purposes of our narrative, the French Armee du Nord had a paper strength of 120,000 in March 1794, although its real numbers were much less. The Austrians could muster some 60000 men in the province and a British army of 15000 was present in Flanders. The British were chiefly interested in the channel ports, both to preserve their lines of communication to those in Allied hands and because they wished to capture the privateering base of Dunkirk. We can therefore ignore them in our campaign. The Austrians had to use a good portion of their strength on garrison duty and can only field around 40000 men for mobile operations across the whole province. Looking at our map and because of the slighting of the famous barrier fortresses by Joseph II, only Namur is a citadel of any strength. Across the frontier, Conde, Valenciennes, Mauberge, Philippeville,are all fortified to varying degrees.

The French forces for our campaign, designated the Armee du Sambre et Meuse, are a part of the Armee du Nord and number around 29000 men. There are 20800 infantry, 6400 cavalry and 48 guns, 16 of which are heavy cannon suitable for siege warfare. They are led by General Henri Deschamps, a former non-commissioned officer in the Royal army. We will introduce his subordinates in a later post. His forces are of varying quality, including some good former soldiers of the old regime, and experienced national guardsmen and other republican troops. The Amalgame of the previous year has been unevenly applied and this, together with an influx of volunteers and conscripts of varying enthusiasm and resilience, means his army will be challenging to handle.

The Austrians for their part have deployed almost two thirds of their mobile strength in this area and so are not outnumbered by the French, which is unusual for this period. They have 23200 infantry; 5600 cavalry; and around 50 guns. These are all experienced, good quality troops, especially the light cavalry. Their leadership is less good: the overall commander Helmuth von Schwarzkopf is a capable enough general but his subordinates, who will also be introduced in a later post, are less so. Suffice to say that collectively, and to varying degrees, they suffer from all of the faults of 'inertness' described by Phil Barker viz: 'lethargy, indecision, timidity, over-confident neglect of elementary precautions, failure to take firm control of subordinates, innate incapacity, dementia, jealousy, extreme pig-headedness, and reluctance to beat the enemy badly...'.

Thursday, 15 January 2015

Maps

I've collected a few maps over the past year.

The plan is to run a campaign or campaigns in some of the principle theatres of operations of the French Revolutionary Wars.

That includes maritime Flanders; the Sambre-Muese region of Belgium; the Rhineland and Italy. I appreciate these were not the only areas where fighting occured but these are the ones that interest me for now.

The first image is of a map developed for a game based on the 100 Days Campaign of 1815 but which would do nicely for campaign in 1793-94:


Secondly, several maps of the Low Countries, Central France, Germany and Italy; all in the same style, from Malcolm McCallum's excellent series here.

Central France

 Italy
 Low Countries
 Northern Germany
Southern Germany


My intention is to use the very simple preliminary map movement system in Phil Barker's 'Horses, Foot and Guns' rules (suitably adapted for a different scale - of which more anon). These maps won't fit this system and will require some adaptation but nothing that is insurmountable I feel (and hope...).

Tuesday, 13 January 2015

What's it All About?


This blog will be a record of my wargaming an alternative timeline to the French Revolutionary Wars 1792-1802 i.e. from the Valmy campaign to the Treaty of Amiens,

I've been working on this project for a little over a year, painting 15mm French Republican and Imperial Austrian armies; researching and developing rules and army lists; and gathering terrain, maps and other sundry odds and ends to enable me to fight out some of the battles waged by these two protagonists.

The project will be 'an alternative timeline' - that is I'll use a variety of methods to provide context for table top battles, some of which I'll borrow from my other blog 'War for Slow Readers' . That blog started out as a record of the wars in Angola 1975-89 but soon expanded to cover other periods and conflicts. Rather than cover the French Revolutionary Wars via that blog I've decided to start a new one.

This is though, an alternative timeline, so it will be 'semi-historical' in that, as a favourite blog of mine puts it'what did happen, what could have happened, what would have happened, doesn't matter at all. Not a jot.' 

Remember games are the goal not the detail. Therefore we don't have to overly worry about the numbers of men, horses, guns, barrels of powder and wine and loaves of bread in a particular theatre of operations. What we have to do though is provide a context for our battles.

We'll define our campaign arena within its interanational setting and local geographic context. We've given it key personages, major locations and strategic direction. And from there our campaign will unfold.

So, kiss your girl goodbye, put on your spurs and saddle up up your horse...