A low ridge, running north-south across the French axis of advance dominates the field. The Austrian commander, on good advice from his staff, opted to position his main force east of the high ground on the reserve slope. He anchored his flanks on the two woods and put a battalion of infantry in the farm and windmill on the crest of the ridge to break up any enemy advance.The Austrian artillery were also placed on the crest of the ridge. Von Balck's biggest problem was that he didn't have enough troops to hold his position if the French attacked with sufficient determination.
The French Generals were mindful of the fate of more than one of their colleagues who had not pressed forward with sufficient vigour, and the presence of one of the more zealous Representatives on Mission, a Parisian bookeeper by the name of Gerard Schwarz, made them nervous. They elected to attack at dawn and when dawn broke and the field was shrouded in mist they decided to attack immediately nonetheless.
Because of the mist the French were able to advance relatively unscathed until they were almost upon the Austrian outposts.
From left to right:
- French chasseurs a cheval advance in column along the Nivelles road halting only when they are engaged at short range by Austrian artillery.
- Le Clerc's infantry, deployed in two demi-brigades a la ordre mixte push forward in the centre
- On the French right three columns of French light infantry belonging to Hinault's avant garde push up the ridge. The two right hand columns, of two battalions each are charged with clearing the woods to their front and flanking the Austrian position.
- Four squadrons of hussars envelop the Austrian left
Above: two demi-brigades of Le Clerc's division push up the ridge with artillery to the fore
The opening shots as the Austrian and French guns engage. The mist began to clear as the artillery duel unfolded. The French hussars are threatening to turn the Austrian infantry's flank in the upper right of the picture
The view from behind the Austrian position. To the left of the windmill the Austrian guns are giving a good account of themselves despite being outnumbered and threatened by French cavalry to their rear. The battalion in the farm and windmill has destroyed a French battalion in column with a series of well disciplined volleys. The remaining battalions of the leading French demi-brigade press on however, and have thrown skirmishers over the crest of the ridge. The Austrian left flank battalions have formed square as French hussars, just out of the picture, are hovering menacingly outside musket range. Two battalions of Austrian infantry have failed to do likewise however and are being charged by the French chasseurs.
The end of the battle. A combination of French infantry in column and charging chasseurs a cheval defeat the Austrian infantry before an belated attack by Austrian dragoons is pressed home. The Austrian army collapses and streams from the field in disorder.
This battle was fought using the 'Bicorne and Bayonet' variant of Phil Barker's 'Horses, Foot and Guns'.
The French outnumbered the Austrians significantly deploying 8800 infantry in 11 battalions; 1500 light cavalry in six squadrons; and 32 guns against 4800 infantry in six battalions; 500 dragoons in two squadrons and only 16 guns.
The Austrian commander escaped with his life. It would be a couple of days before he would have any idea of what units had manged to extricate themselves from the French pursuit in any sort of order.
In fairness to the Austrians it is difficult to see what they could have done given the French superiority in numbers. The mist prevented a move forward as the French columns approached the crest of the ridge as the Austrians only became aware of the advance when it was too late. Von Balck was too timid and indecisive, receiving a - 1 for his PIP die, and this meant he failed to commit his dragoons until it was too late. Poor leadership at unit level can be the only explanation for a prompt failure to form square against French cavalry in the centre but even had this not been the case the use of combined arms by the French, together with decisive leadership, meant where the Austrians did form square on their left they were shot to pieces by artillery.
This battle was fought using the 'Bicorne and Bayonet' variant of Phil Barker's 'Horses, Foot and Guns'.
The French outnumbered the Austrians significantly deploying 8800 infantry in 11 battalions; 1500 light cavalry in six squadrons; and 32 guns against 4800 infantry in six battalions; 500 dragoons in two squadrons and only 16 guns.
The Austrian commander escaped with his life. It would be a couple of days before he would have any idea of what units had manged to extricate themselves from the French pursuit in any sort of order.
In fairness to the Austrians it is difficult to see what they could have done given the French superiority in numbers. The mist prevented a move forward as the French columns approached the crest of the ridge as the Austrians only became aware of the advance when it was too late. Von Balck was too timid and indecisive, receiving a - 1 for his PIP die, and this meant he failed to commit his dragoons until it was too late. Poor leadership at unit level can be the only explanation for a prompt failure to form square against French cavalry in the centre but even had this not been the case the use of combined arms by the French, together with decisive leadership, meant where the Austrians did form square on their left they were shot to pieces by artillery.
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